### Method K

The Affirmative’s method of changing our relationship towards borders is incorrect – only engaging in federal institutions can resolve the harms of the 1AC

#### Understanding trade-offs, budget decisions, and opportunity costs are vital to organizational decision making.

De Vita, et al, 1 (Carol J., senior research associate, with Cory Fleming, center administrator, and Eric C. Twombly, research associate @ Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, The Urban Institute, *Building Capacity in Nonprofit Organizations*, The Urban Institute, ed. Carol J. De Vita and Cory Fleming, April, Chapter 2: Building Nonprofit Capacity: A Framework for Addressing the Problem, p. 5-33)

The literature on organizational and management theory emphasizes the operational decisions and trade-offs that groups face when building their financial and political capacity. Decisions concerning the use of staff, choice of products and services, fundraising and marketing strategies, and even the selection of a board of directors can significantly impact the success or failure of an organization. Decision making involves foregoing one option in favor of another. In short, organizational management decisions produce trade-offs that may be either beneficial or detrimental to the short-run or long-term viability of the organization. All types of organizations face pressures from other groups when attempting to meet their goals. Institutions such as government and for-profit firms may either cooperate or conflict with one another in their efforts to promote community decision making— each with a specific view on what constitutes economic and social balance. Nonprofits also play a key role in affecting local decision making, particularly by representing less popular and competing views in the political process. However, to be effective players, nonprofit organizations must build and sustain financial and political capacity.

#### That skill set is vital to actualizing change outside the confines of the debate space.

Algoso, 11 (Dave, Director of Programs at Reboot, MPA, International Development Blogger, “Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter,” 5/31, http://algoso.org/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/)

Because organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest — whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. A well-run organization makes better decisions about staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. But if you don’t learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.

#### There’s a youth crisis of civic engagement.

Zwarensteyn, 12 (Ellen, Masters of Science, Communications thesis, “High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning,” Grand Valley State University, August, <http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=theses>)

A lack of political learning opportunities reveals how difficult it may be for students to discover or find themselves in politics. As a result, many students are separated and isolated from connections to political worlds and policy analysis. Studies demonstrate how students entering college do not have a firm grasp on political education. Colby (2008) cites an overall decline in political learning despite more students attending college. Moreover, Galston (2001) advances how despite overall advancements in education since the 1950s, political knowledge levels remain stagnant. “If we compare generations rather than cohorts—that is, if we compare today’s young adults not with today’s older adults but with the young adults of the past—we find evidence of diminished civic attachment” (Galston, 2001, p. 219). Specific measures regarding willingness to talk about the news, caring about current events, voting, watching the news or reading the paper, and other traditional forms of political involvement have declined with each generation (Galston, 2001, p. 220-221). The most recent National Assessment of Educational Progress Report documents one consequence to this rote approach to government. Even after a historic presidential election in 2008, students are less involved in political learning and demonstrate less proficiency in 2010 than even in 2006 (National Center, 2011, p. 34). Moreover, “…individuals emerge from the educational system with a lower level of knowledge about current political figures and alignments than 30 or 40 years ago. And individuals of all ages are less able to answer questions about current politics than their counterparts with similar education backgrounds in the past” (Delli Carpinin and Keeter, 1991, p. 607). Schools seem to focus on teaching facts as the end goal of a political education rather than how facts are necessary to understand the fluidity and complexity of current events. Together, the prospects for enduring and thoughtful political engagement are dim in light of these facts.

#### Fragmenting social dialogue through the critique exacerbates social ills – destroying civic engagement.

Block, 5 (Peter, author of *Flawless Consulting: A Guide to Getting Your Experience Used, Stewardship: Choosing Service over Self-Interest,* and others, consultant at Designed Learning, Masters Degree in Industrial Administration from Yale University, “Civic Engagement and the Restoration of Community,” <http://www.peterblock.com/_assets/downloads/Civic.pdf>)

Civic engagement as used here is about a shift in the language and conversation we use to make our community better. We treat civic engagement as something more than voting, volunteering, and supporting events designed to bring people together. While civic engagement is about action, it is not about community action and community development as we normally think of it. The conventional view of community action and development addresses what we usually call problems; areas such as public safety, jobs and local economy, affordable housing, universal health care, education. In the context of civic engagement, these are really symptoms. The deeper cause is in the un-reconciled and fragmented nature of our community. This fragmentation creates a context for solving the symptoms that only sustains them. Otherwise why have we been working on these symptoms for so long, and so hard, and even with so many successful programs, seen too little fundamental change? The real intent of civic engagement is to shift the context within which traditional problem solving, investment, and social and community action takes place. It is aimed at the restoration of the experience and vitality of community. It is this shift in context, expressed through a shift in language, that creates the condition where traditional forms of action can make a difference.

#### Civic engagement is vital to solving collective action problems

Choi, 14 (Young Whan, Civic Engagement Coordinator @ Oakland Unified School District, BA in History from Brown University, Masters Degree in Education from the Teachers College of Columbia University, “Why Does Civic Engagement Matter in Schools?” 1/29, *Educating for Democracy in the Digital Age*, <http://eddaoakland.org/2014/01/29/why-does-civic-engagement-matter-in-schools/>)

These academic benefits cannot be overstressed, but there is still another compelling reason for schools to care about civic engagement. Civic engagement promotes social and political development. One of the great criticisms of the United States is that we, as a country, prize individualism above the needs of the larger society. The push for students to strive for their own individual success and achievement begs for the countervailing balance of a healthy sense of connection and community. Students must also learn that they are an integral part of a larger society and that they have both rights and responsibilities within that society. They cannot develop a sense that they belong to a larger society or live within a political system through theory alone; they must experience society and they must experience that political system. For example, learning about the three branches of government must be coupled with opportunities to effect change through action taken at the local, state, and/or national level. In her government class, Maryann Wolfe has asked her students to do just that. Similarly, being told that they should be compassionate takes on new meaning when students experience what it feels like to care for others through a service learning project. Michelle Espino’s students are acting with care and developing their sense of responsibility to the ecosystem through their recycling project. Finally, instead of banning smartphones and other devices that connect students with the world, schools can provide students with guidance on how to use these powerful tools to take actions that benefits others. Jo Paraiso’s students see themselves as part of an online community, engaging in respectful dialogue with students and adults via their social issue research blogs.

### DA

the liberal democratic state will gradually give way to a cosmopolitan global political community---but a radical change in border policy towards openness would derail the democratic processes required to transition towards cosmopolitanism

Christiano 8 – Thomas Christiano, Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Arizona, Fall 2008, “Immigration, Political Community, and Cosmopolitanism,” San Diego Law Reiew, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 933, p. lexis

Is there any good reason from within moral cosmopolitanism to limit immigration into political societies? A morally cosmopolitan view asserts that the fundamental norms of justice that ground the legitimacy and justice of the political communities of modern states are ones that hold for the whole world community. And whether one holds to liberal egalitarian or classical liberal cosmopolitan principles, the initial impulse of cosmopolitans is to assert that political societies do not have a right to limit immigration into political communities. Each person is entitled on these views to equality of opportunity or freedom of movement respectively and thereby is entitled to move into, or avail themselves of the opportunities in, any political society. Hence cosmopolitanism would appear, on its face, to imply that open borders are required by justice. [\*934] And yet, though we do not know what the consequences of such policies would be, many find the prospect of such policies to be unsettling or even frightening. Many citizens of liberal democracies are unsettled by even the modest immigration flows they see into their societies. The reasons for this anxiety are presumably many. One is fear of loss of control over the community, of living in a society of mutually uncomprehending strangers. Some are concerned that open immigration would leave unfinished the project of bringing social justice to their own society. Another may be simple xenophobia. The first two of these considerations are legitimate ones, though they may not be decisive; others are illegitimate. What place do these kinds of considerations have within a moral cosmopolitan view?

In this paper, I want to suggest one important way to take the above issues seriously that is consistent with a thoroughgoing cosmopolitanism. The idea develops a consideration that has been discussed, but not sufficiently explored, by some cosmopolitans. n1 It starts from the observation that one can be a moral cosmopolitan without being a political cosmopolitan in the sense of advocating for a global political community in the near-term future. To be sure, given the role of the political community in establishing justice among persons, it seems clear that in the long term, moral cosmopolitans must hope for a global political community. In the near-to-medium term, however, efforts to establish a global political community would be quite premature and would probably lead to the kinds of oppression and anomie that Kant worried about. n2 Still, the aspiration to a global political community in the long run and the steps necessary to achieve this aim may give us some guidance as to how to think about the migration of peoples from the point of view of moral cosmopolitanism.

The basic idea of this paper starts from the observation that the modern liberal democratic state represents an essential achievement in the attempts of human beings to realize justice and the common good among themselves. Its achievements are not all we want them to be, and they are limited to the scope of people brought into its jurisdiction. But considering the long and wretched history of human oppression, they are achievements that must attract our respect. Furthermore, the modern democratic state embodies the best hope we have of ultimately bringing justice to the whole of humanity. It is an essential example for global [\*935] institutions and the basic building block on which such global institutions can be created. Liberal democratic states are responsible for the modern development of international institutions that protect and regulate international trade, provide for collective security, and aspire to realize some collective goods such as the protection of the environment and the relief of poverty and disease. And international institutions are maintained by such democratic states through their example and practices. My surmise is that these institutions would not last long without the sponsorship of liberal democratic states. This leads me to argue that, insofar as the development of global political institutions and ultimately the development of a global political community are essential to the realization of the aims of the moral cosmopolitan, the modern liberal democratic state must play a central role. And to the extent that it is necessary to this development, we must protect such states from forces that would undermine their democratic character and the normal functioning of their political systems. Immigration policy should therefore be in part evaluated in terms of whether it undermines the existence and normal practices of liberal democratic states. To the extent that open borders would undermine the existence or normal functioning of liberal democratic states, such a policy should be rejected from a cosmopolitan standpoint because it derails the very institutions that give us some hope for realizing cosmopolitan justice in the future.

Sudden expansions of the notion of citizenship and borders destroy the transition to cosmopolitanism---that prevents the development of global justice

Christiano 8 – Thomas Christiano, Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Arizona, Fall 2008, “Immigration, Political Community, and Cosmopolitanism,” San Diego Law Reiew, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 933, p. lexis

For these reasons, in my view, the ultimate political aim for humanity as a whole must be a global political community. Only a global political [\*951] community can realize justice as much as possible among all the persons in the world. Only it can create a just global order. But this ultimate aim is very far off, to say the least. Those who worry that such an order would be tyrannical are right to worry about it in the short run. Such an order must be constructed very slowly and carefully. A premature construction of a global political community would probably be a disaster. But we do not have reason to think that a global political community, when constitutionally limited and federally structured, could not be a success in the long run. We have seen the development of very large and reasonably successful democratic states. We are witnessing the gestation period of what may become a very large political community in Europe, and we are seeing the development of large-scale regional economic associations in every part of the globe. There are some reasons for hope here, but we must not hurry these developments lest we undermine this progress.

To be sure, a global political community is not necessary to start on the most pressing problems of global poverty and inequality. The development of more partial global institutions can help with these. The World Trade Organization helps with the alleviation of poverty through the expansion of trade. And for those many cases in which trade is not sufficient for the relief of poverty and disease, some modest redistribution of wealth may be possible through international institutions in the short run. But this is only a start, and these more modest institutions in general require democratic states for their sustenance. n32

From a cosmopolitan standpoint, there are two main limitations to even the best democratic states. First, democratic states are mostly pretty imperfectly democratic, and they are certainly imperfectly just. Second, the scope within which each contemporary state establishes justice is limited to a small proportion of the population of the world. [\*952] Still, this is no mean achievement when we consider what most of human history has been like for people.

Again, an understandable cosmopolitan impulse is to try to extend as far as possible the justice establishing powers of states, or at least to make reasonably just and prosperous states open to everyone. But the question we must focus on here is whether these are feasible aims in the near term. It has taken a great deal of time just to develop the reasonably prosperous and moderately just states that exist, and it has taken a great deal of time to turn these into democratic states. Any sudden and very substantial expansion of powers, population, and citizenship would not constitute trivial changes and could do great damage to the states as we know them and their modest capacities to bring justice.

Successful transition to global cosmopolitanism is necessary to avert global suffering and war---the liberal-democratic state must be the transition vehicle towards a global political community

Shaw 1 – Martin Shaw, professorial fellow in international relations and human rights at Roehampton University, London, and an honorary research professor of international relations at the University of Sussex, October 2001, “The unfinished global revolution: intellectuals and the new politics of international relations,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, online: http://www.martinshaw.org/unfinished.pdf

The most fundamental problem with both claims is this. The idea that we have an international system characterised by order jars badly with our understanding of modern history. The extreme violence routinely inflicted by states – through their international relations – on society worldwide is sufficient to bring this notion into question. It is more plausible to see international anarchy as problem than as solution. Recently, international scholarship has increasingly prioritised individual human rights against the claims of states, and has argued for cosmopolitan frameworks for political community.55 In these contexts, as Ken Booth has argued, states should be seen more as the source of ‘human wrongs’ than of order.56

However the answers to this problem are often sought in bypassing the state, in a position which echoes classical anarchism rather than its international realist mutation. For Booth, for example, in own his inaugural lecture (at Aberystwyth in 1991), 'No central government deserves much trust. … Even decent governments are not necessarily mindful of the interests and diversity of all their citizens.' World government is dismissed as an almost totalitarian nightmare: 'The idea of centralising all power on a world scale is a fearful prospect, and not likely to work.' Security will be created, he proposes, through 'an anarchical, global "community of communities"’, but the mechanisms for this remain obscure.57

Hence anarchism proves to be even more deep-rooted in international relations than first appears. Indeed a similar trend is evident in the Gramscian literature on social movements and civil society. Thus Robert Cox argues for a ‘two track’ strategy: ‘first, continued participation in electoral politics and industrial action as a means of defensive resistance against the further onslaught of globalisation; and secondly, but ultimately more importantly, pursuit of the primary goal of resurrecting a spirit of association in civil society together with a continuing effort by organic intellectuals of social forces to think through and act towards an alternative social order at local, regional and global levels.’ 58

The mistakes in this passage are also twofold. First, the myth of globalisation as threat or onslaught – which can only be resisted – is combined with the myth of the weakening of the state.59 Second, hopes for ‘an alternative social order’ are vested in the ‘resurrection’ of civil society, but Cox himself identifies a fundamental difficulty with this scenario, the ‘the still small development of civil society.’60 The expansion of civil society is indeed crucial to the long-term consolidation of a worldwide democratic order. But civil society is not only too weak to take the full weight of global transformation, it is also still too national in form.61 Moreover, it is theoretically and practically inconceivable that we can advance emancipation without simultaneously transforming state power.62

While Booth explicitly rejects world government, Cox largely avoids the role of internationalised state organisations. He sees nation-states as playing ‘the role of agencies of the global economy’63 and seems incapable either of understanding the global transformations of state power, or envisaging a constructive role for them. Critical international theorists have dug themselves into a hole over this issue. In committing themselves to ‘globalization from below’, as Richard Falk64 calls it, they are simply missing political battles that matter in today’s world. Falk is certainly moving towards a new position when he writes:

An immediate goal of those disparate social forces that constitute globalization-from-below is to reinstrumentalize the state to the extent that it redefines its role as mediating between the logic of capital and the priorities of its peoples, including their short-term and longer-term goals.65

But this tortuous language is hardly necessary. People’s movements have been on the streets throughout the last decade, trying to make both national and international state organisations responsive and accountable. The real question is how could this question ever have been marginalised in any serious radical project?

It sometimes seems that critical international theorists have left the state aside.66 Critics evacuate the harsher edges of world politics for the soft ‘non-realist’ territory of political economy, gender and civil society. No such refuge is possible, however. Economic and gender inequalities will not be solved so long as the repressive state is untamed. The new international relations will have to formulate its response the continuing role of organised violence in the world order.

A loose ‘governance without government’67 is too easily supported. While Booth is obviously right that all government is imperfect, the differences between 'relatively decent' and tyrannical government, both nationally and globally, are absolutely critical. Without addressing the nature of contemporary global state networks, and a serious discussion of the ways in which they can be developed into an adequate global authority framework sustained by and sustaining local democracies, we have hardly begun to fashion a new agenda.

‘Yesterday’s visions’ and the old radicalism

World events repeatedly thrust these issues into our faces, but in the wider public debate too, many – lacking an understanding of the new situation – fall back on old ways of thought. The idea of absolute state sovereignty is resurrected by many who should know better, to defend the autonomy of repressive, even genocidal states. Louse Arbour, retiring Chief Prosecutor of the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, provided a terse comment on this move. ‘Since the creation of this Tribunal, the Rwanda Tribunal, the Rome statute’, she says, ‘… there is now a much more ambitious agenda: the one of peace with justice, where no one can hijack the concept of state sovereignty and use it to guarantee his own impunity. These are yesterday’s visions of a peaceful world.’68

That these are indeed ‘yesterday’s visions’ is clear from the selective way in which they are used. It is a curious anti-imperialism that attacks the so-called ‘imperialism of human rights’69 but provides the defence of sovereignty to the imperialism of genocidal oppression. 70 Something is wrong with the radical tradition, when as distinguished a representative as Edward Said could write of the Kosovo war that what he found ‘most distressing’ was the ‘destruction from the air’ wrought by American power71 – not the genocidal massacres by Serbian forces that prompted NATO's (admittedly problematic) response.

Said has reminded us recently of what Thompson called the ‘Natopolitan’ world, in which many intellectuals were indirectly on the payroll of the CIA.72 What he did not acknowledge was its Stalinist counterpart, in which intellectuals sold their souls to the KGB and the Stasi. And there was an anti-Cold War world, in which those who refused the choice of NATO and the Warsaw Pact elaborated their ideas. Although those of us in this intellectual third world turned down the lucre of the blocs, this did not guarantee lasting validity to our ideas.

In the new global era, many characteristic assumptions of the old anti-Cold War left appear increasingly as prejudices. A whole generation has not let go of a mindset, four elements of which are problematic in the new situation. Most fundamental is a residual Third Worldist ideology. According to this, Western, especially American, imperialism is the touchstone for all world politics. Said’s anachronistic conclusion about Kosovo was to ask: ‘When will the smaller, lesser, weaker peoples realize that this America is to be resisted at all costs, not pandered to or given in to naively?’73 There are strong criticisms to be made of American and NATO policies in Kosovo. However a systematic blindness lies behind the continuing belief that America is the principal problem, coupled with the failure to recognise the need for international action against genocide.74

From this viewpoint, non-Western states are potential sites of resistance, organisers of ‘underdeveloped political economies’75 which can contest the dominant form. While sovereignty in general may be regarded as a political form of capitalist social relations76, the sovereignty of non-Western states must be defended from Western power. Yet to support Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, or Chinese over Tibet, gives sustenance to forms of colonial domination deeply mired in blood. Critics find themselves in an inversion of the double standard of which they accuse NATO: if it is right to support Timorese self-determination against Indonesian claims to sovereignty, how can the same right be denied to the Kosovans or Tibetans?77

Second, there are echoes of the intellectual left’s ambiguous attitudes to Communism itself. A residual affinity for post-Communist states makes NATO’s attack on rump Yugoslavia particularly shocking.78 Left-wing critics were especially offended by NATO’s sidelining of Russia, but ignored how the unstable and self-serving character of the Yeltsin government’s positions made it a unreliable partner. 79 Indeed Russia's imperial role in the former Soviet area, reflected in a reluctance to support international justice, makes it a problematic player, however necessary is its participation in European and world security systems.

Third, there is a rather pious attitude to the United Nations, seen as requiring a consensus of the world’s major states to act as a legitimate world centre. Thus leftwing critics were often disingenuous in their criticisms of NATO’s failure to seek UN authorisation – ignoring Russian and Chinese determination to veto any action against Yugoslavia, in the light of their own imperial repression in Chechnya, Tibet, etc. They also ignored, of course, the anachronistic character of the Security Council veto itself.

Finally, there is the generalised pacifism of anti-Cold War politics. To my mind, this is the element of this position with by far the greatest continuing salience. The horror at aerial bombardment has deep roots in modern history – for many older people based on childhood experience80, for others resonating from the nuclear threat. Objections to the use of airpower are compounded by complaints about ‘the fastidiousness articulated about the loss of American lives’, which Said was not alone in finding ‘positively revolting’.81

Nevertheless, this concern too often remains at the level of abstract criticism, and fails to specify the kinds of alternative power-projection that might address the dire situations of people like the Kosovans or Timorese. Indeed critics of bombing also often reject not only other forms of military power, but international political and legal interventions, as mere Western power-projection.82 A simple pacifism was only partially viable during the Cold War (even then there were reasonable demands for ‘alternative defence policies’). It does little to address the realities of global politics, in which a relatively modest use of military power may protect a threatened civilian population.

Underlying these specific positions, of course, is the continuing socialist critique of a capitalist world. Democratisation is also often seen as a new form of Western or American power.83 Ironically, this functionalist approach attributes too much power to the West, and too little to the movements that are forging global-democratic change. It is a very limited sort of socialist understanding that fails to grasp the potential of democracy to open up social reform. This socialism has not learnt the fundamental lesson of its twentieth-century failures: no genuine social change is possible without political democracy and individual freedom.

The new politics of international relations

The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the anti-imperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need to recognise three fundamental truths. First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West.

From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organisations and civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war.84 Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence. (To put this another way: the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.)

Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. We need these power networks, but we need to tame them too, to make their messy bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ argued for by David Held85. It will also require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities. This is not a separate problem: social and economic reform is an essential ingredient of alternatives to warlike and genocidal power; these feed off and reinforce corrupt and criminal political economies. Fourth, if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop international political interventions, legal institutions and robust peacekeeping as strategic alternatives to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid.86

As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state, as well as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western and other governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.87 What I have outlined is a huge challenge; but the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into partial defeat, or degenerate into new genocidal wars - perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.

Vote negative to embrace a gradual rethinking of borders.

A gradual approach towards opening the border is imperative---only laying the groundwork for open borders gradually can create a sustainable commitment to openness

Appel 9 – Jacob M. Appel, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Community Health at Brown University, May 4, 2009, “The Ethical Case for an Open Immigration Policy,” online: http://www.opposingviews.com/i/the-ethical-case-for-an-open-immigration-policy

As the issue of immigration returns to our national agenda, policy makers should remember that there is a third alternative to either deportation or amnesty for so-called “illegal” aliens: a return to the “open door” policy that built our nation. I do not have the professional expertise to speak to the economics of such an approach—although my personal intuition tells me that new immigrants will generate jobs rather than consume them—but the ethics of open borders are strikingly clear. Treating human beings differently, simply because they were born on the opposite side of a national boundary, is hard to justify under any mainstream philosophical, religious or ethical theory.

That is not to say that all “birthrights” are unjust. For example, while being born into a particular family is the result of chance, the right to inherit some of one’s parents’ property serves useful and meaningful social purposes—such as encouraging mothers and fathers to work and save for their offspring. The “birthright” of nationality serves no such social purpose. In contrast, the freedom to travel and to settle where one wishes, in pursuit of political freedom or economic opportunity, is among the most basic of human rights. I am grateful that my grandfather was admitted to this country, fleeing Belgium in the days before World War II. I am horrified by the sealed borders that prevented boatloads other Jewish refugees from following him. From an ethical point of view, however, it is difficult to distinguish such political refugees—to whom we do grant asylum today—from the millions of economic refugees who seek freedom from abject poverty.The principal difference between the Irish peasants who once fled the potato blight on coffin ships, and the desperate Haitian rafters that our navy forcibly repatriates today, is bad timing.

Any reasonable “open door” immigration policy should still exclude those who pose a danger to our current citizenry: would-be terrorists, wanted felons, tuberculosis patients unwilling to accept treatment, etc. From an ethical standpoint, a liberal democracy might also restrict immigration should newcomers threaten to use the political process to dismantle existing freedoms—if, for example, ten million advocates of Taliban-style fundamentalism were to demand entrance into Luxembourg. Considering the size and diversity of our nation, any meaningful threat to American democracy from immigrants seems highly far-fetched.

This is not a policy proposal. I acknowledge that developing a functional, open borders regime could take several years, and might even require the progressive elevation of existing immigration quotas over time until the point where supply exceeded demand. That does not mean that open borders should not be the long-term goal of any ethical immigration policy. The modern version of Martin Luther King Jr’s “dream” is that any child, born into the poorest slums of Africa, Asia or Latin America, should have a right to claim those same freedoms and opportunities of American citizenship that far too many of us take for granted. In an era when we are divided in so many ways as a nation, this should be the sort of visionary policy to which all people—religious and secular, traditional and progressive, Native Americans and descendants of immigrants—can say, Yes We Can!

### Case

#### The aff’s claim to emancipation collapses the real material difference between our position as debaters and oppressed individuals for whom resistance is not a simple language-game---their deployment of an unproblematic posture of victimization spotlights the aff’s righteousness while robbing the oppressed of protest

Chow 93—Anne Firor Scott Professor of Literature at Trinity College of Arts and Sciences, Duke University (Rey, Writing Diaspora, 11-5)

Until the very end of the novel, Jane is always excluded from every available form of social power. Her survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or missionary's wife. She repeatedly flees from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Brontë demonstrates the power of words alone. 18¶ This reading of Jane Eyre highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude that was to become the flip side of Western imperialism's ruthlessness. Lying at the core of Anglo­American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understanding—that Brontë's depiction of a socially marginalized English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with England's empire­building ambition rather than opposed to it—that prompted Gayatri Spivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring to Brontë's treatment of the "madwoman" Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the "native subject" is not created as an animal but as "the object of what might be termed the terrorism of¶ 12¶ the categorical imperative." This kind of creation is imperialism's use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to "make the heathen into a human so that he can be treated as an end in himself." 19 In the twentieth century, as Europe's former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way:¶ The place that was formerly occupied by the Church or Churches vis­à­vis the established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries, in the functioning of the opposition known as leftist….¶ [T]here is vis­à­vis the established order, a relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the left which, since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned….20¶ The Maoist retains many of Jane's awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into "truth" and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great Orientalist blames the living "third world" natives for the loss of the ancient non­Western civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite of their "backwardness," a puritanical alternative to the West in human form—a dream come true.¶ In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the Maoist is disillusioned to watch the China they sanctified crumble before their eyes. This is the period in which we hear disapproving criticisms of contemporary Chinese people for liking Western pop music and consumer culture, or for being overly interested in sex. In a way that makes her indistinguishable from what at first seems a political enemy, the Orientalist, the Maoist now mourns the loss of her loved object—Socialist China—by pointing angrily at living "third world" natives. For many who have built their careers on the vision of Socialist China, the grief is tremendous. In the "cultural studies" of the American academy in the 1990s, the Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way¶ 13¶ terms such as "oppression," "victimization," and "subalternity" are now being used. Contrary to Orientalist disdain for contemporary native cultures of the non­West, the Maoist turns precisely the "disdained'' other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases, identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralism, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non­Western cultures into a generalized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West." 21¶ Because the representation of "the other" as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist's mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization, and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker's own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a "third world intellectual," citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part­Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being "victimized" by the structured time at an Ivy League institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper­class background from one of the world's poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical "third world" representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were "raped" when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self­dramatization all take the route of self­subalternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice—the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is now no longer distinguishable from those of us who have had our consciousnesses "raised."¶ In their analysis of the relation between violence and representation, Armstrong and Tennenhouse write: "[The] idea of violence ¶ 14¶ as representation is not an easy one for most academics to accept. It implies that whenever we speak for someone else we are inscribing her with our own (implicitly masculine) idea of order." 22 At present, this process of "inscribing" often means not only that we "represent" certain historic others because they are/were ''oppressed"; it often means that there is interest in representation only when what is represented can in some way be seen as lacking. Even though the Maoist is usually contemptuous of Freudian psychoanalysis because it is "bourgeois," her investment in oppression and victimization fully partakes of the Freudian and Lacanian notions of "lack." By attributing "lack," the Maoist justifies the "speaking for someone else" that Armstrong and Tennenhouse call "violence as representation."¶ As in the case of Orientalism, which does not necessarily belong only to those who are white, the Maoist does not have to be racially "white" either. The phrase "white guilt" refers to a type of discourse which continues to position power and lack against each other, while the narrator of that discourse, like Jane Eyre, speaks with power but identifies with powerlessness. This is how even those who come from privilege more often than not speak from/of/as its "lack." What the Maoist demonstrates is a circuit of productivity that draws its capital from others' deprivation while refusing to acknowledge its own presence as endowed. With the material origins of her own discourse always concealed, the Maoist thus speaks as if her charges were a form of immaculate conception.¶ The difficulty facing us, it seems to me, is no longer simply the "first world" Orientalist who mourns the rusting away of his treasures, but also students from privileged backgrounds Western and non­Western, who conform behaviorally in every respect with the elitism of their social origins (e.g., through powerful matrimonial alliances, through pursuit of fame, or through a contemptuous arrogance toward fellow students) but who nonetheless proclaim dedication to "vindicating the subalterns." My point is not that they should be blamed for the accident of their birth, nor that they cannot marry rich, pursue fame, or even be arrogant. Rather, it is that they choose to see in others' powerlessness an idealized image of themselves and refuse to hear in the dissonance between the content and manner of their speech their own complicity with violence. Even though these descendents of the Maoist may be quick to point¶ 15¶ out the exploitativeness of Benjamin Disraeli's "The East is a career," 23 they remain blind to their own exploitativeness as they make "the East" their career. How do we intervene in the productivity of this overdetermined circuit?

#### Critical theory fails as a mechanism of liberatory politics – the top critical theorists agree.

Eakin, 3 (Emily, writing for the New York Times, “The Latest Theory Is That Theory Doesn’t Matter,” *New York Times*, 4/19/03, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/19/arts/19CRIT.html>)

These are uncertain times for literary scholars. The era of big theory is over. The grand paradigms that swept through humanities departments in the 20th century — psychoanalysis, structuralism, Marxism, deconstruction, post-colonialism — have lost favor or been abandoned. Money is tight. And the leftist politics with which literary theorists have traditionally been associated have taken a beating. In the latest sign of mounting crisis, on April 11 the editors of Critical Inquiry, academe's most prestigious theory journal, convened the scholarly equivalent of an Afghan-style loya jirga. They invited more than two dozen of America's professorial elite, including Henry Louis Gates Jr., Homi Bhabha, Stanley Fish and Fredric Jameson, to the University of Chicago for what they called "an unprecedented meeting of the minds," an unusual two-hour public symposium on the future of theory. Understandably, expectations were high. More than 500 people, mostly students and faculty, squeezed into a lecture hall to hear what the mandarins had to say, while latecomers made do with a live video feed set up in the lobby. In his opening remarks, W. J. T. Mitchell, the journal's editor and a professor of English and art history at Chicago, set an upbeat tone for the proceedings. "We want to be the Starship Enterprise of criticism and theory," he told the audience. But any thought that this would be a gleeful strategy session with an eye toward extending theory's global reach, or an impassioned debate over the merits of, say, Derrida and Lacan, was quickly dispelled. When John Comaroff, a professor of anthropology and sociology at Chicago who was serving as the event's moderator, turned the floor over to the panelists, for several moments no one said a word. Then a student in the audience spoke up. What good is criticism and theory, he asked, if "we concede in fact how much more important the actions of Noam Chomsky are in the world than all the writings of critical theorists combined?" After all, he said, Mr. Fish had recently published an essay in Critical Inquiry arguing that philosophy didn't matter at all. Behind a table at the front of the room, Mr. Fish shook his head. "I think I'll let someone else answer the question," he said. So Sander L. Gilman, a professor of liberal arts and sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago, replied instead. "I would make the argument that most criticism — and I would include Noam Chomsky in this — is a poison pill," he said. "I think one must be careful in assuming that intellectuals have some kind of insight. In fact, if the track record of intellectuals is any indication, not only have intellectuals been wrong almost all of the time, but they have been wrong in corrosive and destructive ways." Mr. Fish nodded approvingly. "I like what that man said," he said. "I wish to deny the effectiveness of intellectual work. And especially, I always wish to counsel people against the decision to go into the academy because they hope to be effective beyond it." During the remainder of the session, the only panelist to venture a defense of theory — or mention a literary genre — was Mr. Bhabha. "There are a number of people around the table here and a number of people in the audience, in fact most of you here are evidence that intellectual work has its place and its uses," he insisted. "Even a poem in its own oblique way is deeply telling of the lives of the world we exist in. You can have poems that are intimately linked with political oppositional movements, poems that actually draw together people in acts of resistance." But no one spoke up to endorse this claim. In fact, for a conference officially devoted to theory, theory itself got very little airtime. For more than an hour, the panelists bemoaned the war in Iraq, the Bush administration, the ascendancy of the right-wing press and the impotence of the left. Afterward, Mr. Gates, who arrived late because he had been attending a conference in Wisconsin, said: "For a moment, I thought I was in the wrong room. I thought we would be talking about academic jargon. Instead, it was Al Qaeda and Iraq — not that there's anything wrong with that." Finally, a young man with dreadlocks who said he was a graduate student from Jamaica asked, "So is theory simply just a nice, simple intellectual exercise, or something that should be transformative?" Several speakers weighed in before Mr. Gates stood up. As far as he could tell, he said, theory had never directly liberated anyone. "Maybe I'm too young," he said. "I really didn't see it: the liberation of people of color because of deconstruction or poststructuralism." If theory's political utility is this dubious, why did the theorists spend so much time talking about current events? Catharine R. Stimpson, a panelist and dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Science at New York University, offered one, well, theory. "This particular group of intellectuals," she said, "has a terror of being politically irrelevant."

#### Metaphysical claims are non-verifiable abstractions fail to understand or solve specific instances of atrocity. Their link analysis proves their rose-colored lenses of universal theory application.

Fish, 3 (Stanley, Davidson-Kahn Distinguished University Professor of Humanities and Law @ Florida International University College of Law, “Truth but No Consequences: Why Philosophy Doesn’t Matter,” *Critical Inquiry*, 29, Spring, pp. 389-417)

That’s the first half of Kramer’s argument (and mine). The second half is simply, or not so simply, the flip side. If metaphysical theses and positions do not flow from mundane utterances and actions, the formulation by an actor of a metaphysical thesis commits him to no particular form of mundane utterance or action, nor does it rule out any form of mundane utterance or action. It has more than occasionally been said that the way one will behave in particular local contexts will be at least in part a function of one’s metaphysical commitments or anticommitments. Thus we are told on one side that those who make antifoundationalist arguments—arguments asserting the unavailability of independent grounds for the settling of factual or moral disputes—cannot without contradiction assert their views strongly or be trusted to mean what they say (on the model of the old saw “if there is no God, then everything is permitted”); and we are told on the other side that those who make foundational arguments—arguments identifying general and universal standards of judgment and measurement— are inflexible, incapable of responding to or even registering the nuances of particular contexts, and committed to the maintenance of the status quo. Kramer responds (and again I am with him) by warning against the confusion of two levels of consideration and against the mistake (resulting from the confusion) of drawing a direct line from one to the other. It is a mistake because on one level—the level of metaphysical or general propositions such as “all things are socially constructed” or “all things are presided over by a just and benevolent God”—the point is to describe the underlying bases of reality, those first principles that rather than arising from particulars confer on particulars their shape and meaning. Such principles or basic theses or all-embracing doctrines are, Kramer says, “ultimate in their reach and are thus fully detached from any specific circumstances and contexts.” 4 It is because they are fully detached from specific circumstances— that is how they are derived, by abstracting away from specifics—that metaphysical doctrines like the social constructedness of everything or the God-dependent status of everything can be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed by specifics: A metaphysical view can hardly undergo either confirmation or refutation through empirical methods. Precisely because a metaphysical doctrine must abstract itself from specifics . . . in an effort to probe what undergirds all specifics of any sort, it retains its lesser or greater cogency regardless of the ways any specific facts . . . have turned out. 5 The cogency it does have for those persuaded of it is a philosophical or theoretical cogency, a cogency fashioned in the course of philosophical argument where the typical questions are, What is the nature of reality? or, Where do facts come from? questions the answers to which will not be found in the observable facts; when the answers are found (to the satisfaction of one or more of the participants) the observable facts will have been explained (at least within the framework of particular general theses), but they will not have generated or confirmed or falsified the perspective that explains them. For example, the doctrine that a benevolent God presides over all things will not be disconfirmed by the existence of poverty, war, oppression, injustice, genocide, and so on; for it is precisely the claim of the doctrine to account for these and other facts in its own terms (which typically will include attendant doctrines like the doctrine of original sin and the doctrine of the mysteriousness of God’s ways), and that claim will be made good (if it is) by abstract theoretical arguments and not by empirical investigation. Someone defending the benevolence of God in the face of the Nazi Holocaust will be trafficking in theological concepts like sin, redemption, retribution, suffering, patience, the last days, and so on. He will not be considering whether its perpetrators were the unique products of a virulent German anti-Semitism or exemplars of a bureaucratic mentality found everywhere in the modern world; he will not be poring over diagrams of gas chambers or assessing the effects either of resistance movements or of the failure to resist. His is a thesis not about how a particular thing has happened but about how anything—of which this particular is an instantiation and an example—happens, and happens necessarily. His job is not to precipitate an explanation of the event out of the examination of documents and other sources but to bring the fact of the event into line with an explanation already assumed and firmly in place. (The master teacher of this skill is Augustine who, in his On Christian Doctrine, advises those who find biblical passages that seem subversive of the faith to subject those passages to “diligent scrutiny until an interpretation contributing to the reign of charity is produced.”)6 He is, in short, a theologian, maintaining and elaborating an ultimate perspective, and not a historian who has set himself the disciplinary task of relating a historical, mundane occurrence to its contingent and multiple causes. (I know that there are those who argue that the Holocaust is not an appropriate object of ordinary historical analysis; but this merely means that they have switched jobs and become philosopher/theologians rather than historians.)

#### the ballot is not a tool of emancipation, but rather a tool of revenge---it serves as a palliative that denies their investment in oppression as a means by which to claim the power of victory

Enns 12—Professor of Philosophy at McMaster University (Dianne, The Violence of Victimhood, 28-30)

Guilt and Ressentiment We need to think carefully about what is at stake here. Why is this perspective appealing, and what are its effects? At first glance, the argument appears simple: white, privileged women, in their theoretical and practical interventions, must take into account the experiences and conceptual work of women who are less fortunate and less powerful, have fewer resources, and are therefore more subject to systemic oppression. The lesson of feminism's mistakes in the civil rights era is that this “mainstream” group must not speak for other women. But such a view must be interrogated. Its effects, as I have argued, include a veneration of the other, moral currency for the victim, and an insidious competition for victimhood. We will see in later chapters that these effects are also common in situations of conflict where the stakes are much higher. ¶ We witness here a twofold appeal: otherness discourse in feminism appeals both to the guilt of the privileged and to the resentment, or ressentiment, of the other. Suleri's allusion to “embarrassed privilege” exposes the operation of guilt in the misunderstanding that often divides Western feminists from women in the developing world, or white women from women of color. The guilt of those who feel themselves deeply implicated in and responsible for imperialism merely reinforces an imperialist benevolence, polarizes us unambiguously by locking us into the categories of victim and perpetrator, and blinds us to the power and agency of the other. Many fail to see that it is embarrassing and insulting for those identified as victimized others not to be subjected to the same critical intervention and held to the same demands of moral and political responsibility. Though we are by no means equal in power and ability, wealth and advantage, we are all collectively responsible for the world we inhabit in common. The condition of victimhood does not absolve one of moral responsibility. I will return to this point repeatedly throughout this book.¶ Mohanty's perspective ignores the possibility that one can become attached to one's subordinated status, which introduces the concept of ressentiment, the focus of much recent interest in the injury caused by racism and colonization. Nietzsche describes ressentiment as the overwhelming sentiment of “slave morality,” the revolt that begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values. 19 The sufferer in this schema seeks out a cause for his suffering—“ a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering”— someone on whom he can vent his affects and so procure the anesthesia necessary to ease the pain of injury. The motivation behind ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, is the desire “to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.” 20 In its contemporary manifestation, Wendy Brown argues that ressentiment acts as the “righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured,” which “delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the ‘injury’ of social subordination.” Identities are fixed in an economy of perpetrator and victim, in which revenge, rather than power or emancipation, is sought for the injured, making the perpetrator hurt as the sufferer does. 21¶ 30¶ Such a concept is useful for understanding why an ethics of absolute responsibility to the other appeals to the victimized. Brown remarks that, for Nietzsche, the source of the triumph of a morality rooted in ressentiment is the denial that it has any access to power or contains a will to power. Politicized identities arise as both product of and reaction to this condition; the reaction is a substitute for action— an “imaginary revenge,” Nietzsche calls it. Suffering then becomes a social virtue at the same time that the sufferer attempts to displace his suffering onto another. The identity created by ressentiment, Brown explains, becomes invested in its own subjection not only through its discovery of someone to blame, and a new recognition and revaluation of that subjection, but also through the satisfaction of revenge. 22¶ The outcome of feminism's attraction to theories of difference and otherness is thus deeply contentious. First, we witness the further reification reification of the very oppositions in question and a simple reversal of the focus from the same to the other. This observation is not new and has been made by many critics of feminism, but it seems to have made no serious impact on mainstream feminist scholarship or teaching practices in women's studies programs. Second, in the eagerness to rectify the mistakes of “white, middle-class, liberal, western” feminism, the other has been uncritically exalted, which has led in turn to simplistic designations of marginal, “othered” status and, ultimately, a competition for victimhood. Ultimately, this approach has led to a new moral code in which ethics is equated with the responsibility of the privileged Western woman, while moral immunity is granted to the victimized other. Ranjana Khanna describes this operation aptly when she writes that in the field of transnational feminism, the reification of the other has produced “separate ethical universes” in which the privileged experience paralyzing guilt and the neocolonized, crippling resentment. The only “overarching imperative” is that one does not comment on another's ethical context. An ethical response turns out to be a nonresponse. 23 Let us turn now to an exploration of this third outcome.

#### We should hear stories of victimization and acknowledge the multiplicities of privilege that exist within our identities---but you should not use your ballot to affirm them unless they are tied to a political proposition in terms of the resolution, shifting language from "I am" to the language of "I want” is crucial to prevent a psychology of constant conflict

Minow 96 (Martha Prof of Law and Dean @ Harvard University, “SPEECH: Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law,” Oregon Law Review 75 Or. L. Rev. 647 Lexis)

To identify fluidity, change, border-crossing, and unstable categories is not to deny the real force and power that some people have accorded group labels and categories, to the clear detriment of others. 59 What else could explain a regime that, in historian Barbara Fields's words, "considers a white woman capable of giving birth to a black child but denies that a black woman can give birth to a white child"? 60 As another historian, David Hollinger, puts it in his recent book, Post-Ethnic America, "Racism is real, but races are not." 61 The power to create groups and oppress them is real, but the rationale for those groups or for the assignment of members is not. Benedict Anderson's book Imagined Communities artfully traces the creation of nations as official eff- [\*663] orts by dynastic regimes to control workers and peasants; in the process, colonial powers created census categories that in turn stamped racial categories to replace previous religious, status, and anonymous identities. 62 Thomas Scheff argues that these cognitive maps of difference join with emotions of pride and shame to fuel prejudice and oppression. 63 In this view, group-based differences need not have a foundation in biology, or anything but historic oppressions, to make them real enough to warrant recognition and mobilization. 64 We do not need refined understandings of identities to acknowledge how much people in power have hurt others along lines producing the harsh reality of identities. The Nazis resolved the question of who is a Jew in the most definitive way. 65 Similarly, "black means being identified by a white racist society as black." 66 Thus, Catharine MacKinnon locates gender difference not in biology but historic oppression when she asks, "Can you imagine elevating one half of a population and denigrating the other half [\*664] and producing a population in which everyone is the same?" 67 Judith Butler argues that the meaning of anyone's gender is troubled and unfixed except by exercises of convention and authority. 68 Marilyn Frye and Peggy MacIntosh, among others, have detailed the ways in which part of the comforts enjoyed by those with more power is the distance from other people's pain and the seeming invisibility of their own privileges. 69 Empirical studies of individuals' self-understandings highlight the impact of societal views about groups and discrimination by more powerful groups. 70 Regardless of the theoretical arguments against essentialism and for intersectionality, many people believe and perceive that their identities are bound up with experiences of subordination along simplistic group lines. 71 Experiences of mistreatment along group lines influence how individuals view people from their own groups, and people in other groups. Todd Gitlin's book, which is chiefly an attack - from the progressive left - on identity politics as a distraction from deeper issues of poverty and economic dislocation, nonetheless asserts confidently that "blacks are more likely than whites to doubt the promise of America; women more likely than men to care about children and fear rape; Jews more likely than Buddhists to study the Holocaust." 72 The racial divide in public responses to the verdict in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson is only one recent confirmation [\*665] of this perception. 73 Focusing on historical and ongoing oppression cannot, however, fully rehabilitate identity politics. 74 The problem here is less incoherence than the personal, psychological, and political costs of engaging in politics around group identifications. Individuals' experiences of membership in more than one group may produce complicated responses to discrimination. For example, a study suggests that some young African-American males develop an exaggerated conception of male power and devaluation of females, apparently as a coping response to racial and economic disadvantage. 75 Privilege and oppression both can mark a person's experience, even simultaneously. Simply validating experience affords no guarantee of ending a person's own role in dominating others. Mobilizing African-American males is a current development in identity politics, as in the Million Man March, but that strategy risks splintering men and women who could be working together. 76 That strategy also could seem to condone sexist attitudes that undermine the vision of equality and human liberation behind identity politics. Here, then, is a place where the errors of essentialism, the insights of intersectionality, and the basic incoherence of group identities run up against the case of adopting categories that were never designed to help those assigned to them. Mobilizing in resistance to oppression based on a group trait may strengthen that oppression and the conceptions that it unleashes. As one observer recently put it: This politics of being, essentializing or fixing who we are, is in actuality often an inversion or continuation of ascribed colonial identities, though stated as "difference." The stereotypi- [\*666] cal contents of Africanness or Indianness, for example, are in the end colonial constructs, harbouring the colonizer's gaze. We look at ourselves with his eyes and find ourselves both adorned and wanting. 77 The internalized sense of inferiority and the assumption that human relationships must be marked by hierarchy and domination are legacies of oppression. A piece of the oppressor, then, lies within each person, as Franz Fanon, Albert Memmi, George W. Hegel, and so many observers recount. 78 Paulo Freire has argued that the true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situation, but also the piece of the oppressor which is implanted within each person and which knows only the oppressor's tactics and relationships. 79 This insight undergirds Jacques Ranciere's observation that emancipation is never the simple assertion of an identity; it is always, at the same time, the denial of an identity given by the ruling order. 80 Efforts to reclaim identities produced by oppression can express creative resistance, 81 but it is not clear they can extirpate either the specific category's origins or the reductionism of categorical thinking. Besides strengthening the categories and methods of oppression, identity politics may freeze people in pain and also fuel their dependence on their own victim status as a source of meaning. Wendy Brown has written powerfully about these dangers; she argues that identity-based claims re-enact subordination along the lines of historical subjugation. 82 This danger arises, in her view, not only because of the ready acceptance of those very [\*667] lines of distinction and oppression in a society that has used them, but also because people become invested in their pain and suffering, or in her terms, their "wounded attachments." 83 She writes: Politicized identity, premised on exclusion and fueled by the humiliation and suffering imposed by its historically structured impotence in the context of a discourse of sovereign individuals, is as likely to seek generalized political paralysis, to feast on generalized political impotence, as it is to seek its own or collective liberation through empowerment. Indeed, it is more likely to punish and reproach ... than to find venues of self-affirming action. 84 Brown urges efforts to shape a democratic political culture that would actually hear the stories of victimization while inciting victims to triumph over their experiences through political action. 85 Toward this end, she proposes shifting the focus from identity toward a focus on desires and wants, from the language of "I am" to the language of "I want." 86 In this way, perhaps politics could move beyond the artificially fixed and frozen identity positions and blame games toward expressive and engaged political action, but Brown has yet to sketch a language of solidarity rather than individual self-interest. Therapeutic understandings of trauma and recovery support this call to shift from what an individual lacks to what an individual, with others, can envision and seek. Judith Herman's work on child abuse, incest, rape, and war-time trauma emphasizes the crucial importance to individual psychological health of recovering memories and learning to speak about atrocity. 87 She also stresses the significance of moving on through mourning, acting [\*668] and fighting back, and reconnecting with others. 88 Identity politics risks directing all energy and time to pain without moving through recovery, action, and reconnection with larger communities. There remains a crucial place for anger and recrimination, as well as forgiveness and reconciliation. 89 But when identity politics takes the form of claiming excuses due to past victimization, it even makes it difficult for others to remember and acknowledge past wrongdoings and harms. 90